Engagement or Quarantine: How to Deal with the Islamist Advance
|Wednesday, March 7,2007 00:00|
|By Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|
Panel 1: Islamists between Exclusion, Cooptation and Engagement
Amr Hamzawy elaborated three reasons why Islamist movements are key to Arab reform. First is their mass constituencies, won over by their religious message, which resonates with considerable segments of Middle Eastern populations, and by their social activism; their success is facilitated by the fact that their counterparts on the political scene, ruling establishments and liberal leftist movements, suffer respectively from a crisis of legitimacy and debilitating political weakness. Second is the dynamics of their opposition status and their clear desire to participate in the political system, both to capitalize on their popularity and to avoid repression. Third is their potential impact. Hamzawy pointed out that the starting point in debate tends to be that Islamists will impede democratic reform, whereas it is in actuality the regimes that impede democratic reform. Islamist reformers face the two challenges of how to build alliances for reform and how address their internal differences in a democratic fashion (which will lead to diversity within the Islamist spectrum with a positive impact).
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham described the trend in Islamist movements toward embracing moderation and democratic reform, pointing out that in many countries Islamist leaders have become reform’s chief advocates. She first elaborated on the strategic dimension of this shift, pointing out that leaders realize the potential benefit their mass constituencies will earn them in elections. There are other benefits to moderation. Adopting more flexible positions widens international opportunities for leaders; running for and winning office gives them a wider, often non-Islamist, constituency; and strategic moderation deflects the suspicions of the ruling regime that Islamists seek to radically alter the political system. Yet, Wickham emphasized that this shift toward moderation also denotes a real qualitative change. There is a critical mass within Islamist movements that adopts a ‘centrist’ approach to Islam and challenges the revivalist agenda. She elaborated evidence of this change, such as the de-emphasis on sharia and the increased focus on defense of the family, an Islamic frame of reference, and the public good, as well as on popular sovereignty and elected institutions. Wickham’s research found that value change hinged on sustained dialogue with other groups, often in the form of safe spaces and consensus across party lines. However, Wickham also pointed out that Islamist leaders are constrained by their members not to go too far in their moderation, leading to vagueness and contradictions within movements.
Radwan Masmoudi laid out what he considers to be two givens in the political systems of the Middle East: that the currently ruling regimes are unsustainable and that Islamist parties will become increasingly important. Thus, it is crucial for outsiders to support the people’s democratic aspirations and to build relations with Islamic parties. He asserted that it is impossible to entirely separate religion and politics and that a democratic system in the Middle East will necessarily reflect the Islamic character of its society. He spoke about the historical context of today’s Islamism, saying that at the end of the colonial era leaders saw religion as a handicap. With the failure of the oppressive secular elite it was only a matter of time before there was a resurgence of religion. Today, Islamists are the main opposition groups. Their slogans resonate with the same masses that overwhelmingly support democracy, especially the youth. The main impediment to reform is the regimes, whose repression and failure to provide for their populations lead to an extremely dangerous mix of anger, lack of education, and large numbers of unemployed youth. While Masmoudi agreed that Islamists are more moderate once in power, he also acknowledged that precautions should be taken against the monopolization of religion for political purposes. The lack of a clergy in Sunni Islam serves as a check on this danger, but it can be further averted through the promotion of several Islamic parties in each country to allow for competing interpretations of Islam. In addition, secular groups should have a better understanding of the relationship between religion and the state and not let themselves be perceived as anti-religious.
Panel 2: The Local Agendas of Islamist Advances
Moderator: Kirsten Maas, Heinrich Boell Foundation
Khaled Hroub discussed the politics of struggle and ongoing strategizing of Hamas in Palestine. There are moderate and extremist elements in all movements and when movements are under siege, extremist elements prevail. Within Islam as a whole, there has also been moderation and extremism. In the Golden Era of Islam one saw toleration of atheism and even homosexuality. Extremism is also bred by exclusion. Hroub elaborated on several cases in which formerly excluded extreme movements are now participating in the political system and interacting positively with secular groups. He also said that external pressure on Islamist movements is actually counterproductive since it leads them to adopt a siege mentality that hinders evolution toward moderation. Hroub spoke about the two forces within Hamas that have existed since its inception: a nationalist liberation force and an Islamist force. He feels that the movement has reached a major turning point in which the nationalist liberation force is currently taking the lead. Three documents illustrate this: the recent election platform, the national unity government program, and a speech by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya to the Palestinian parliament. These documents appeal to a much wider constituency, touch on a broad number of issues, emphasize citizenship, and present Hamas as the leader of the Palestinian nation. Hroub feels that the policies of Israel, the United States and Europe have blocked the natural evolution of the movement toward moderation, which would be a great opportunity for the region at large. Moreover, Hamas will play a crucial role in forming the Palestinian consensus and it would be overly optimistic to expect peace between Israel and Palestine without the movement.
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb began her discussion of Hezbollah in Lebanon by explaining the movement’s unique character and context and that it precariously balances Arab, Islamist and Shiite communal agendas. Within Lebanon’s divided political system, Hezbollah emerged as both an Islamic movement and Shiite party for the theretofore largely unrepresented Shiite community. Hezbollah chose political participation because it needed to legitimize its resistance and entrench its position, needs that only increased with the recent withdrawal of Syria. Saad-Ghorayeb asserted that Hezbollah thus represents an exception to the thesis that participation leads to moderation. Since its participation in government is aimed at preserving its armed status, its moderation in fact serves a radical end. She also took issue with the term “moderation,” as many political leaders find it offensive and it is too simplistic to describe the many different facets of Islamist political movements. The prospects for Hezbollah’s disarmament are dim, as it has led all Lebanese parties to agree that the confrontation with Israel requires such extraordinary measures, and has successfully argued that the profound weakness of the Lebanese state obviates the argument that it should monopolize the means of coercion. The fact that Hezbollah will not disarm is a reality recognized by all Lebanese actors as well as the United States. In fact, Hezbollah’s armed status is preferable in the eyes of many Lebanese political actors, since its disarmament would raise the greater threat of its enhanced political participation.
Najib Ghadbian described how, in the past few years, the Muslim Brotherhood has moved to the forefront of the Syrian opposition despite its illegal status within the country. Several reasons account for this shift, among them the rising popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood within Syria, the increased religiosity of society as a whole, the perception that it represents the Sunni majority, and its charismatic current leadership. As shown in a series of recent documents, the Brotherhood has moderated its discourse. It no longer calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria, but instead for the use of Islam as a frame of reference. In addition, the Brotherhood has since the mid-1990s renounced the use of violence and urged President Bashar al-Assad to institute modest reforms such as the release of political prisoners and the lifting of emergency laws. Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood has called for a modern democratic state characterized by parliamentarism, pluralism, separation of powers, rule of law, and citizenship as the basis for all rights and duties. The Brotherhood has allied with the secular opposition, joining opposition groups in drafting the Damascus Declaration and most recently allying with the newly created National Salvation Front.
Panel 3: Recognizing the Importance of Islamist Organizations while Doubts Persist: Options for External Actors
Nathan Brown synthesized some of the main lessons of the day’s conference discussions. He pointed out the two basic assumptions, that political reform gives openings to Islamists because of their mass constituencies and that Islamists have successfully captured the political reform issue. He asserted that the first main lesson is that these are complex movements that go beyond the electoral realm to encompass complex religious or national agendas. The second lesson is that they are ideological movements that take ideology seriously, yet also maintain space for strategic ideological flexibility. The third lesson is that there has been real fundamental change in the beliefs of Islamist movements, but there remains significant ambiguity and division within them; often it is not clear even to members where they come down on critical issues. A fourth lesson is that incumbent regimes themselves impede reform by treating Islamist movements as a security challenge. Brown then questioned the degree to which external actors can constructively influence Islamist movements, since their evolution occurs in response to internal and not external impetuses and their very appeal comes from the fact that they do not curry favor with the outside world. He suggested that external leverage is far greater and more effective with the ruling regimes, where external actors can first of all communicate clearly that they are not afraid of Islamists, a dynamic that regimes have so far exploited extremely effectively. External actors can also support the development of institutional safeguards in political systems. Brown concluded that although engagement has real positive effects, among them increasing our knowledge of Islamist movements, teaching them how to speak to an international audience, and sending a message to regimes that the U.S. considers them real political actors, it may not be the most important question.
Many of these themes were elaborated in the discussion that followed, which touched on the varying character and degree of U.S. influence in Middle Eastern countries, the use of engagement as a form of pressure on regimes, and the need to go deeper into the complexities of different types of engagement.
Synopsis prepared by Meredith Riley, Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Project.